Speedy Trial Act Held Unconstitutional by Ross, Thomas G.
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 8
Number 3 April, 1978 Article 13
4-1978
Speedy Trial Act Held Unconstitutional
Thomas G. Ross
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ross, Thomas G. (1978) "Speedy Trial Act Held Unconstitutional," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 8: No. 3, Article 13.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol8/iss3/13
The addition of Chapter 208 to Title
18 of the United States Code became law
on January 3, 1975. 18 U.S.C. §§3161 et
seq. Commonly known as the Speedy
Trial Act of 1 9 74,i its enactment by Con-
gress has provoked extensive debate.
Basically, the Speedy Trial Act minim
izes judicial discretion by legislating
guidelines by which the court shall deter
mine whether an accused's Sixth Amend-
ment right to a speedy trial has been
breached. The Act structures "time
limits" within which the government must
indict, arraign and try a defendant in
order to protect this constitutional
guarantee. The Sixth Amendment articul-
ates this basic right, as follows:
In all criminal posecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial...
This provision has been held by the
Supreme Court to be a "fundamental"
right of a criminal defendant, i.e. a riglit
that applies to the States through the
edict of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213
(1972).
Justice Powell, writing for the Supreme
Court, further demonstrated the balancing
interests of the speedy trial right in Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972):
The right to a speedy trial is generically
different from any of the other rights
enshrined in the Constitution for the
The bill creating this Act was S. 3936 which was in
troduced by Senator Sam Ervin because of his op
position to the preventive detention provisions in the
District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal
Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91 358, 210
(July 29, 1970); D.C. Code §23-1321 et seq.; see
generally, Frase, infra at 673-674; see also, Ervin,
Forward: Preventive Detention-u Step Backward
for Criminal Justice, 6 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L.
Rev. 291-303 (1971).
protection of the accused. In addition
to the general concern that all accused
persons be treated according to decent
and fair procedures, there is a societal
interest in providing a speedy trial
which exists separate from, and at
times in opposition to, the interests of
the court.
Id. at 519.
The problem with the Sixth Amend-
ment guarantee, which Congress sought
to remedy by enacting the Speedy Trial
Act, was the fact that there was no defini-
tive point in time beyond which the right
was considered breached. This determina-
tion was within the province of the judici-
ary. The Supreme Court had considered
the sanction for violations of the Sixth
Amendment speedy trial guarantee, hold-
ing that the "only possible remedy" was a
dismissal of the criminal prosecution.
Wingo, supra at 522; see also, Strunk v.
U.S., 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
Most states already have statutory or
constitutional speedy trial guidelines. See
generally, Frase, The Speedy Trial Act of
1974, 43 U.CHI.L.REv. 667 (1976);
Poulos and Coleman, Speedy Trial, Slow
Implementation: The ABA Standards in
Search of a Statehouse, 28 HASTINGS L.J.
357 (1976). As the latter title suggests,
the American Bar Association has itself
dealt substantively with this issue. See
ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL
(Approved Draft, 1968).
Since its enactment, the strongest op-
position to the federal speedy trial law has
The Act's basic "time limits" do not become effec-
tive until July 1, 1979. The mandates of the statute
will then require that a criminal defendant be in-
dicted within 30 days of arrest, arraigned within 10
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been directed at the stringent "time
limits'' 2 it imposes:
... Congress may have set its sights
somewhat higher than the realities of
federal criminal justice will tolerate.
Frase, supra at 722-723.
... critics support the Act's goal of
guaranteeing criminal defendants
speedy-trial rights more specific than
the vague constitutional provisions.
But they say the law is excessive. Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger calls it
'rigid'."
Speedy Trials are Slowing the Courts,
64 A.B.A.J. 175.
In a recent opinion, Judge Joseph H.
Young attacked the dictates of the Speedy
Trial Act using a unique and strongly
worded approach. In U.S. v. Howard, 440
F.Supp. 1106 (D.Md. November 7,
1977), 3 he held the Act to be invalid as an
"unconstitutional encroachment on the
judiciary," violative of the Constitution's
implied doctrine of separation of powers.
The Court is cognizant of the defen-
dants' right to a speedy trial, just as it is
cognizant of all their rights under the
Constitution, and it is satisfied that the
even-handed scrutiny of the appellate
courts will do it without legislative in-
terference. The dictates of Barker v.
Wingo, supra, and Rules 48(b) and
50(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure adequately protect a defen-
dant's right to a speedy trial, which
must by its very being remain a "rela-
tive concept."
440 F. Supp. at 1113.
Judge Young's decision was pursuant
to defendant Howard's, and a codefen-
3 Defendant Howard and a codefendant were arrested
on August 11, 1977 and charged with violating the
proscriptions of the Controlled Substance Act, 21
U.S.C. §846. Howard was also charged conducting a
continuing criminal enterprise violating the provi
sions of 21 U.S.C. §848. Because Howard posed a
"substantial risk of flight," bail was set at $400,000,
which he was unable to post. The codefendant's bail
was set at $30,000, which he, also, was unable to
meet. Motions for bail reduction were denied by the
U.S. Magistrate. The codefendant, Hartzog, was ar-
raigned on August 19, 1977, while Howard, due to
his hospitalization and a defense counsel request,
was not arraigned until August 26, 1977. Indictment
followed, and trial was set for November 14, 1977.
As stated in the text, defense counsel made motions
on behalf of both defendants under the Speedy Trial
Act's dictates for dismissal or, in the alternative, for
release of the defendants pending trial. Judge Young
denied the motions for the reasons following in the
text.
dant's, motions to dismiss the indictment
or, in the alternative, to be released from
custody pending trial based on the
government's delay and violations of the
transitional provisions4 of the Speedy
Trial Act or the court rules of the U.S.
District Court for Maryland.'
In addition to holding the Act to be un-
constitutional, the court denied the relief
sought in the defense motions, finding
that neither of the defendants' rights
under the federal speedy trial "transi-
tional" mandates had been breached on
the following bases:
1. The record showed that Howard's
trial was scheduled within the 120-day
period allowable after arraignment, 18
U.S.C. §3161(g);
2. Under one of the Act's exceptions,
the time that the defendant spent in the
hospital was excluded from the 90 days
allowed before commencing trial as in
the case of any defendant who, like
Howard, is incarcerated pretrial, 18
U.S.C. §3161(h)(4), 3164;6
3. Release pending trial was not re-
quired where there was "fault" for the
delay on the part of defendant and his
counsel, 18 U.S.C. §3164(c);
4. The proper administration of justice
necessitated an extension of the 90-day
limitation for the codefendant under
another of the Act's exceptions, 18
U.S.C. §3161 (h) (7) (8).
4 18 U.s.C. §3163 of the Act provides for gradual
"phase in" of the "time limits" which will be fully
implemented on July 1, 1979. Under §3161 the re
quirements for the period July 1, 1977 until June
30, 1978 were that the defendants must be indicted
within 45 days of arrest, arraigned in the following
t0 days after indictment, and brought to trial within
120 days following indictment.
The defendants' motions were also directed at the
provisions in Local Rule 30 of the United States Dis
trict Court for the District of Maryland. Judge Young
denied the motions, however, on the grounds that
the Rule provided no sanction for the specification
that "trial of a defendant shall commence within 60
days of the arraignment." Additionally, as to release
pending trial, Judge Young noted that Local Rule 30
provided for release only when the Speedy Trial
Act's provision, 18 U.S.C. §3164, was violated.
The court indicated that there is a difference of opin-
ion on this issue in the various circuits. The Ninth
Circuit held that the excludable time periods under
18 U.S.C. §3164(h) do not apply to the 90 day pro
vision under §3164 for those defendants detained
pretrial. U.S. v. Tirasco, 532 F.2d 1298 (1976). The
court also noted various courts that had held the op
posite, U.S. v. Corley,179 U.S.App. D.C. 88, 548
F.2d 1043 (1976); U.S.v. Masco, 415 F.Supp. 1317
(W.D.Wisc. 1976); U.S . Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 579
(SD.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. U.S. v.
Martinez, 538 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1976). The court
indicated that the best view, and the one he adopted,
is that the excludable time periods under §3161(h)
modify the time limits imposed by §3164. See,
Frase, supra, at 712-715.
One of the key controversies surround-
ing the Speedy Trial Act, as Judge Young
articulated, is whether the following
language of Justice Powell in the
unanimous Supreme Court holding in
Wingo, supra, gave Congress the legis-
lative license to proceed with this
codification of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee:
But such a result would require this
Court to engage in legislative or
rulemaking activity, rather than in the
adjudicative process to which we
should confine our efforts. We do not
establish procedural rules for the
States, except when mandated by the
Constitution. We find no constitutional
basis for holding that the speedy trial
right can be quantified into a specific
number of days or months. The States,
of course, are free to prescribe a rea-
sonable period consistent with con-
stitutional standards, but our approach
must be less precise. (emphasis added).
Wingo, supra at 523.
One commentator interprets the Wingo
holding by stating:
***the Court has held that the constitu-
tional limit depends on the facts of the
particular case. Although fixed time
periods would facilitate definition and
enforcement of the right, the creation
of such rules has been held to be a leg-
islative function.
Frase, supra at 667; See, e.g., statement
of Congressman Cohen in Hearings on S.
754, H.R. 7873, H.R. 658, H.R. 773, and
H.R. 4807 before the Subcommittee on
Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess., at 214, 358 (1974) noted by Judge
Young in Howard, supra, 440 F. Supp. at
1111-1112.
Judge Young in Howard, supra, con-
tradicted this interpretation in his opin-
ion:
But a clear reading of this language
fails to support such an inference. The
Supreme Court's refusal to specify a set
number of days within which a defen-
dant must be tried was not an invitation
to the Congress to enact speedy trial
legislation, but a comment generally on
the role of an adjudicating court and
specifically on the nature of the right to
a speedy trial.*** Moreover, it is sig-
nificant that when the Court com-
mented that the "states... are free to
prescribe a reasonable period consis-
tent with constitutional standards," no
mention was made that Congress could
so act. The language is not addressed to
state legislatures but to the "states."
The import of this suggestion is that the
Supreme Court could not overturn
state legislation on speedy trial limits
which was consistent with the Sixth
Amendment. Obviously, any separation
of powers protection of the state judici-
ary would have to come from the state
constitution as interpreted by the state
courts. In sum, the Wingo language is
not in the least inconsistent with the
holding that the Federal Speedy Trial
Act violates basic constitutional no-
tions of the separation of powers.
Howard, supra at 1112; See also, Wingo,
supra at 530-531.
Justice Powell in Wingo stated the
Court's categorical rejection of the fixed-
time period for federal jurisdictions
"because it goes further than the Con-
stitution requires," while upholding the
right of individual states to have such
standards.
In addition to Judge Young's opinion
that the Act itself is unconstitutional, he
also wrote that its practical limitations are
in the form of "monumental administra-
tive headaches" and the unwarranted dis-
ruptions and inefficiency caused by the
Act's time limits on the criminal and civil
dockets and the administration of justice.
While I agree with Judge Young in his
opinion that Congress has over-stepped
the bounds of the separation of powers
doctrine in enacting speedy trial legis-
lation and has usurped a previously
judicial determination, it appears, even if
the Act's constitutionality is not ques-
tioned further, that grave administrative
problems will result, especially when the
Act is fully implemented on July 1, 1979,
unless the law is amended to give the
judiciary more flexibility in this area.
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